We consider games with a continuum of players and intermediate prefer- 
Introduction
Consider an individual who lives in the suburbs of a large city and who can only reach her office in the city center by driving over one of two bridges. While the choice of which bridge to take depends on attributes such as her home and office locations and how pleasant either route may be, it also depends on the choice of all others driving to the center, namely through their influence on how crowded each bridge is. In this example, it is conceivable that equilibrium behavior displays individuals with similar attributes choosing the same bridge. Such equilibrium can be interpreted as displaying behavioral conformity in the sense that it induces a partition of the individuals into a small number of societies (two in the example) of similar individuals making the same choice.
Such form of conformity has been rationalized by Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) . In particular, for games where each player's payoff depends only on his choice and on the average choice of the others, they have shown that if preferences depend linearly on individual attributes, then for all ε > 0, all sufficiently large games have an ε -equilibrium that induces a partition of players into a small number of societies (relative to the number of players), with an upper bound independent of ε.
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In this paper, we extend the framework of Wooders et al. among several dimensions. We do this by allowing for preferences that do not satisfy the continuity and linearity assumptions, by considering a stronger notion of behavioral conformity, and by allowing for a continuum of players.
Our results rely on the notion of quasi-intermediate preferences, which is obtained by dropping the continuity requirement of intermediate preferences, introduced in Grandmont (1978) . These preferences allow us to obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium displaying strong behavioral conformity in dispersed games with a continuum of players in the following sense: all players in the same society, including those in its boundaries, play the same action. Furthermore, it allows us to obtain the existence of a Nash equilibrium displaying behavioral conformity (where all players in the interior of a society play the same action) when the game is not dispersed (i.e., when there is a positive measure of players with the same attribute). These two results are then used to obtain similar results for games with a large, but finite number of players.
An advantage of our approach is that our result on social conformity for large finite games generalizes Theorem 3 in Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) . In fact, we show that the same conclusion can be reached under more general assumptions on the attribute space and on players' preferences: the attribute space can be any bounded, convex and (Borel) measurable subset of R L , and the function assigning preferences to players need only be measurable, quasi-intermediate and have an equicontinuous image.
Despite such generalization, the main advantage of focusing on games with a continuum of players with quasi-intermediate preferences is conceptual. Indeed, it clarifies the essential elements needed for behavioral conformity and allows for simple, conclusion holds under more general preferences.
constructive proofs that can be used to construct equilibria displaying behavioral conformity in applications.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the notation and main definitions. In Section 3 we consider dispersed anonymous games (as in MasColell (1984) ) with quasi-intermediate preferences; the results in this section are not only interesting in their own right, but also serve as tools for several others in the paper. In Section 4, we generalize the notion of quasi-intermediate preferences and
use it to obtain a stronger existence result in binary games (i.e., games with only two actions). Section 5 considers games with a continuum of players as defined in Schmeidler (1973) , and Section 6 examines games with a large, but finite number of players. In Section 7 we consider the relationship between our results and Theorem 3 of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) . Some concluding remarks are in Section 8. Finally, the Appendix contains the proof of the lemmas and some other auxiliary results.
Notation and Definitions
In this section, we present the classes of games we consider. Then, we introduce the equilibrium concept that we use for each of them, as well as our behavioral conformity concepts. To simplify the presentation, we assume that there is a single crowding type.
The (straightforward) extension to an arbitrary number of crowding types is discussed in Subsection 2.4 and in the remarks following the proof of Theorem 1.
Pregames, Induced Anonymous Games and Induced Games
We focus on games and anonymous games that are derived from pregames as in Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) . In all cases, we assume that each player's preferences depend on her action and on the distribution of actions chosen by all players, which corresponds to the global interaction property of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) .
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Throughout the paper, A denotes a finite set of actions, M denotes the set of probability measures on A and U the set of continuous functions u : A × M → R. The space U is endowed with the sup norm, which makes it a complete, separable metric space. Since A is finite, M can be identified with the standard unit simplex in R
|A|
, and so we endow it with the sup norm. Furthermore, we sometimes represent a probability measure µ ∈ M by the vector µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ |A| ), where A = {a 1 , . . . , a |A| } and µ i = µ({a i }) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |A|.
A pregame consists of a particular description of the primitive elements of games.
Indeed, it is defined by an action space, by an attribute space and by a preference function, associating a payoff function to every attribute; hence, in order to obtain a game from a pregame, one has simply to associate an attribute to every player.
Formally, a pregame G is described by a bounded, convex, Borel measurable attribute space Ω ⊆ R L , L ≥ 1, a finite action space A, and a Borel measurable preference function U : Ω → U .
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We denote such pregame by G = (Ω, U, A). Note that the measurability assumption on U generalizes the continuity in the attributes assumption of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) .
A class of games that can be obtained from pregames is that of anonymous games.
The distinctive feature of an anonymous game is that there is no explicit reference to the players who will play the game; in fact, one is given only a statistical image of their preferences through a distribution on U. A pregame induces an anonymous game simply by associating to it a probability measure λ defined on the measurable 2 See Section 7 for the details. 3 Throughout the paper, measurable will be understood to indicate Borel measurable.
subsets of Ω. This measure λ and U define a measure
for all measurable subsets B of U. Thus, an induced anonymous game G is described by a probability measure λ on Ω and by a pregameG = (Ω, U, A), and so we denote it by G = (λ, Ω, U, A). The measure λ describes the demographics of the pregamẽ In contrast, a game makes explicit the set of players. As above, we can obtain a game from a given pregame. Since the pregame already lists the set of actions and the preferences associated with each attribute, a game induced by a pregame (an induced game, for short) is defined by any function assigning an attribute to every player. Formally, an induced game is described by a set T of players, a measure ϕ on T describing the relative weight of players, a measurable attribute function α : T → Ω assigning an attribute to each player and a pregameG = (Ω, U, A). Thus, we represent such a game by G = (T, ϕ, α, Ω, U, A). Clearly, these elements allow us to define a game in the usual way, by listing its (measure space of) players (T, ϕ), their action space A, and their payoff function, here defined by the measurable function U • α that assigns payoff functions to players.
Both induced anonymous games and induced games can be classified according to the properties of their defining elements. A binary induced anonymous game (resp. induced game) is an induced anonymous game (resp. induced game) satisfying |A| = 2. An induced anonymous game G is dispersed if λ is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure . This condition means that λ(B) = 0 for all measurable sets B such that (B) = 0.
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In particular, λ({ω}) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, and so λ is nonatomic.
Regarding induced games, we use both the measure space of players and the attribute function to classify them. An induced game G = (T, ϕ, α, Ω, U, A) is injective if α is an injective function and it is dispersed if the probability measure ϕ • α and ϕ = . That is, the set of players is the unit interval endowed with the Lebesgue measure.
Similarly, for all n ∈ N, an induced game with n players is an induced game
where the set of players is a finite set with n elements endowed with the uniform measure. Formally, let T n = {1, . . . , n} and ν n be the uniform measure on T n (i.e., ν n satisfies ν n ({t}) = 1/n for all t ∈ T n ). Then, G is an induced game with n players if T = T n and ϕ = ν n .
Equilibrium Concepts
We start by defining strategies for induced anonymous games and for induced games.
For induced games, a strategy is a (measurable) function from players into actions (e.g., Schmeidler (1973) ). Regarding induced anonymous games, we also define strategies as a function into actions, but this time defined on the attribute space. Essentially, it is as if players were named according to its attribute.
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Thus, a strategy in an induced anonymous game G = (λ, Ω, U, A) is a measurable 4 Note that (Ω) > 0 since λ(Ω) = 1. Hence, for example, λ defined by λ(B) = (B)/ (Ω) for all measurable subsets B of Ω is a probability measure on Ω which is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. 5 Hence, it corresponds to a symmetric equilibrium (see Mas-Colell (1984) ).
Of course, if T is finite, then the measurability requirement is trivially satisfied.
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The definition of equilibrium for induced games depends on whether an induced game has a continuum of players or not. The main difference lies in the fact that if there is a continuum of players, the action of a single one has no impact on the distribution of actions. Therefore, a strategy is a Nash equilibrium if all players are choosing an optimal action given the distribution induced by it on the set of actions.
Formally, a Nash equilibrium of an induced game G = ([0, 1], , α, Ω, U, A) with a continuum of players is a strategy f such that
for all a ∈ A and all t ∈ [0, 1].
Note that a dispersed induced anonymous game is like an induced game with a continuum of players under the interpretation that the set of players is Ω. In fact, both ([0, 1], ) and (Ω, λ) are nonatomic measure spaces. Therefore, the definition of a Nash equilibrium for induced anonymous games follows the one given above for induced games. A strategy f in a dispersed induced anonymous game
is a Nash equilibrium of G if
for all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A. Rath (1995, Lemma 1) ). With this remark in mind, it is appropriate to describe the class of games we consider as games where each player's payoff depends only on his choice and on the average choice of the others.
In contrast to games with a continuum of players, each player's choice affects the distribution of actions in a game with a finite number of players. Given a strategy f in an induced game G with n players, a ∈ A andt ∈ T , let f \t a be defined by:
In words, f \t a is the strategy that results if playert changes his action from f (t) to a, which in turn changes the distribution on A from
with n players if
) − ε for all t ∈ T n and all a ∈ A.
Behavioral Conformity
The notion of behavioral conformity we use is the one considered by Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) in their Theorem 3. For every strategy f , let A(f ) = {a ∈ A :
(a) = ∅} be the set of actions that are played by some player. A strategy f in an induced game G displays behavioral conformity if there exists a partition of Ω into
This notion of behavioral conformity can be strengthened by requiring that all players in the same society play the same action. A strategy f in an induced game
This notion can also be defined for induced anonymous games as follows. A strategy f in a induced anonymous game G displays strong behavioral conformity if
Crowding Types
In this subsection, we consider the case where an attribute can be decomposed into a crowding type and a taste type, as in Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) . As in their paper, assume the attribute space equals C × Ω, where
interpreted as the set of crowding types and Ω as the set of taste types.
In the context, players care about the distribution of actions for every crowding type, and so payoff functions are continuous functions v :
be the space of all such functions, a pregame is now defined by the attribute space C × Ω, by a measurable preference function U : C × Ω → V and by the action space
A.
As before, a pregame and a probability measure λ on C × Ω defines an induced anonymous game. Clearly, this measure can be decomposed into m measures (λ 1 , . . . , λ m ) such that λ i is a measure on {c i } × Ω. A strategy is now a measurable function f : C × Ω → A, which again can be written as (f 1 , . . . , f m ) with
Clearly, a similar definition can be presented for induced games, both with a continuum and a finite number of players.
Quasi-Intermediate Preferences
In this section, we show that if players' preferences in a dispersed induced anonymous game satisfy some convexity properties, then every distribution over the set of actions induced by a Nash equilibrium can be obtained by a Nash equilibrium displaying strong behavioral conformity. Thus, every statistical image of the play of such a game -provided by the distribution over the actions -can be understood as a consequence of (strong) behavioral conformity by the players.
The notion of convexity of preferences needed for this result is (a generalization of) that of intermediate preferences, introduced by Grandmont (1978) .
This notion is defined in the following way: The preference u is between u 1 and
Then, the family of preferences U (Ω) is quasi-intermediate if for all ω,ω ∈ Ω and γ ∈ (0, 1), Uω is between U ω and Uω whereω = γω
Note that this definition generalizes Grandmont's notion of intermediate preferences, since it does not require the set {ω ∈ Ω : U ω (a, µ) ≥ U ω (ā, µ)} to be closed in Ω, for every a andā in A and all µ ∈ M. Furthermore, it follows from Example 3 in Grandmont (1978) that it also generalizes the linearity in the taste types assumption of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) .
The following theorem is our behavioral conformity result for this class of preferences in dispersed induced anonymous games. 
. In particular, there exists a Nash equilibrium that displays strong behavioral conformity.
Theorem 1 shows that if players' preferences in a dispersed induced anonymous game are quasi-intermediate, then every distribution induced by a Nash equilibrium in A can also be induced by a Nash equilibrium displaying behavioral conformity. The existence of a Nash equilibrium for this class of games (Schmeidler (1973) ; see also Khan and Sun (2002, Theorem 2) ), then implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium that displays strong behavioral conformity.
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The idea of the proof is illustrated by the following examples. The first example is of a trivial induced anonymous game in which all players are indifferent between
and µ ∈ M. In this induced anonymous game, every strategy is a Nash equilibrium, and so, one easily constructs a Nash equilibrium f of G that does not display strong behavioral conformity. For example,
The distribution induced by f on
This distribution can be easily obtained by a Nash equilibrium h displaying strong 7 Note that Theorem 2 in Khan and Sun (2002) guarantees the existence of a strategy such that almost all players best-reply. However, we can change it in a set of measure zero if necessary in order to guarantee that all players best-reply.
behavioral conformity. Indeed, let
More generally, in order to deal with the case of several actions being indifferent for all players, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let λ be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure, C ⊆ R L be a bounded, measurable, convex set and c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c k ∈ R be such that c i ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and k i=1 c i = λ(C).
Then, there exists a convex partition
We can use Lemma 1 in the above example by considering
The second example we consider is an induced anonymous game in which players are inhabitants of a city with two bridges. Bridge 1 has a better view than that of bridge 2, and players' preferences depend on this fact and on how crowded each bridge is. For concreteness, let
and
The first component of u reflects the level of congestion of each bridge: if µ 1 is higher than 1/2, it means that bridge 1 is more congested than bridge 2, and so the first component of u is higher for bridge 2 than for bridge 1. The second component simply expresses that bridge 1 has a better view than bridge 2.
Finally, ω measures how much weight a player attributes to the view seen from the bridge and to its level of congestion. For example, player ω = (1, 0) cares only about the level of congestion, while player ω = (0, 1) cares only about the view seen from each bridge.
A Nash equilibrium of this induced anonymous game is
In order to show that f is in fact a Nash equilibrium, we introduce the following ({b 1 }) = 3/4, one easily sees that
Hence, all players are playing a best-reply.
However, f does not display strong behavioral conformity. Here, as it was in the case above, the failure of this property depends on the way f is specified in the set of players who are indifferent between the two actions. In this example, we can allocate all the indifferent players to bridge 1 since the set of those players has measure zero and so will not change the distribution over actions. Hence, the strategy h defined by
is a Nash equilibrium of G that displays strong behavioral conformity and induces the same distribution on A as f .
In general, that this procedure of allocating all the indifferent players to a particular action can be used is guaranteed by the following lemma. It shows that if not all players are indifferent between two actions, the set of those that are indifferent is contained in a hyperplane, which has Lebesgue measure zero (and so measure zero for all measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to it).
and c a,ā ∈ R such that q a,ā = 0 and
In the above example, the set {ω ∈ Ω :
We turn to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let f be a Nash equilibrium of G. For convenience,
. By definition, we have that τ ({a}) = λ({ω ∈ Ω : f (ω) = a}). We will use f to define a strategy h displaying strong behavioral conformity such that
= τ and h(ω) solves max a∈A U ω (a, τ ). Clearly, the two last properties imply that h is a Nash equilibrium.
Define the following equivalence relation in
for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, action a is equivalent to a under ∼ if all players are indifferent between a and a when the distribution is τ . Let A i ⊆ A(f ) be the set of actions a ∈ A(f ) for which there is a ∈ A(f ), a = a, such that a ∼ a and, for every
denote the equivalence class of action a. Thus, A i is the set of
Since both {ω ∈ Ω :
The set B i (resp. S i ) is the set of players for whom a i is a (resp. the unique) best-reply
In conclusion, we have shown that for all 1
Define D k+1 = E k+1 and, for all i > k + 1, define
Letā ∈ A i and i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , M } be such thatā = a i . Define
As above, one has that λ(
Since
it follows by Lemma 1 that there exist disjoint convex subsets
Hence, for all a ∈ A(f ), there exists a convex subset C a such that τ ({a}) = λ(C a ).
Furthermore,
and the family
Then h is a Nash equilibrium and induces a partition of Ω into M = |A(f )| ≤ |A| convex sets.
We conclude this section with a remark on how to extend Theorem 1 to the case of several crowding types (see Subsection 2.4). Essentially, all it takes is to write
, and then apply the approach used in its proof to each i = 1, . . . , m separately.
Generalized Quasi-Intermediate Preferences
The behavioral conformity result of Theorem 1 can be obtained under weaker restrictions on players' preferences. Essentially, the generalization that we consider dispenses with the property that indifference surfaces are hyperplanes, expressed in the statement of Lemma 2. However, our approach in this case requires that the set of action have only two actions.
Our notion of generalized quasi-intermediate preferences is as follows. A family of preferences
This notion generalizes the notion of quasi-intermediate preferences since
where ω = γω 1 + (1 − γ)ω 2 , with γ ∈ (0, 1).
For binary dispersed induced anonymous games, we can obtain the conclusion of Theorem 1 assuming only that preferences are generalized quasi-intermediate. 
The following example illustrates Theorem 2. It is again an example of a dispersed induced anonymous game where the players are inhabitants of a city with two bridges.
In this example, there are three types of people: those who always prefer bridge 1, those who always prefer bridge 2 and those whose preferences depend on how crowded each bridge is.
Formally, for all i = 1, 2, 3, let u i : A × M → R be defined by
We assume that β ∈ (1, 3), and so players with preferences described by u 3 have a bias toward bridge 2.
Let
Clearly, players with preferences described by u 1 (resp. u 2 ) must play b 1 (resp. b 2 ) in a Nash equilibrium. Regarding players with preferences described by u 3 , they are best-replying if µ({b 1 }) = 1/(1 + β), since in this case they are indifferent between the two bridges. Thus, if f is a strategy such that • f
then f is a Nash equilibrium.
Given the above, it is easy to construct a Nash equilibrium that does not display strong behavioral conformity. As in Section 3, the failure of this property depends on how a strategy is specified in the set of players who are indifferent between the two actions. Note that, in contrast to the case in Section 3, the set of players who are indifferent between the two actions is no longer a set of measure zero.
Our approach to obtain a Nash equilibrium h displaying behavioral conformity and
: (2, −1) · z = 0}; then, H 1 is a hyperplane that separates the set of players that weakly prefer b 1 from the set of players that strictly prefer b 2 , while H 2 separates the set of players that weakly prefer b 2 from the set of players that strictly
Our goal is to obtain a hyperplane H = {z :
the second property guarantees that • h
, while the first guar-
In this example, it is easy to verify that
In general, we use Lemma 3 and the intermediate value theorem to find the desired hyperplane.
Lemma 3 Let λ be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Let
Then, the function η → λ(C η ) is continuous.
We turn next to the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let f be a Nash equilibrium of G and τ
. We can partition Ω in three sets Ω 1 , Ω 2 and Ω 3 , where:
By assumption, all these sets are convex. Also, note that λ(
We will assume that all Ω i , i = 1, 2, 3, have strictly positive measure, the other cases being analogous.
Define h : Ω → A as follows:
whereΩ satisfies
bothΩ and Ω \Ω are convex.
Thus, we have partitioned Ω into two convex sets. So, we are left to show that there exists a setΩ with the above properties.
Since Ω 1 ∪ Ω 3 and Ω 2 are convex and disjoint, there is a hyperplane that separates them: i.e., there are p = 0 and c such that
Also, we can separate
If H 1 = H 2 , then λ(Ω 3 ) = 0 and we can letΩ = Ω 1 . Hence, we may assume that
We will consider two cases.
Suppose first that H 1 is parallel to H 2 . Then, there exists w ∈ R L such that
That is, we may assume that q = p and c
One easily sees that bothΩ and Ω \Ω are convex.
Finally, suppose that H 1 is not parallel to H 2 . This implies L ≥ 2 and so, by Lemma 9, they intersect, say at w. For each η ∈ [0, 1], we consider a hyperplane
Then, it follows that w ∈ H η and that
The last claim above can be established as follows:
Therefore,
Hence, ηp · z ≤ ηc and so
Then, define
We have that C 0 = Ω∩H 2 and so λ(C 0 ) = 0. Also, C 1 = M and so λ(
Furthermore, by Lemma 3, the function η → λ(C η ) is continuous and so there is η *
This follows because
and λ({z :
Finally, defineΩ = Ω 1 ∪ C. Then, claims 1 and 2 below imply that bothΩ and Ω \Ω are convex.
Claim 1 The setΩ is convex.
Proof. Since both Ω 1 and C are convex, it is enough to show that if x ∈ Ω 1 , y ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1) then z = αx+(1−α)y ∈Ω. By the convexity of {ω :
Claim 2 The set Ω \Ω is convex.
Proof. Note first that
This is shown as follows:
case, then z ∈ Ω 1 ∪ Ω 3 and so z ∈Ω. In the second case, then z ∈ Ω 1 and also z ∈ C.
Since both Ω 2 and D are convex, it is enough to show that if x ∈ Ω 2 , y ∈ D and
This completes the proof.
Behavioral Conformity in Induced Games with a Continuum of Players
So far we have been able to establish behavioral conformity in a strong sense by considering dispersed induced anonymous games. One can think of these games as games in which players are named according to their attribute. Furthermore, only a subset of (at most) measure zero of players have the same attribute, which makes it easier to partition the attribute set into societies.
The difficulty in establishing behavioral conformity in induced games is that a positive measure of players may have the same attribute. Therefore, it may be im-possible to have them play the same action and to guarantee, at the same time, that the total measure of those playing that action is equal to a given value.
Nevertheless, it may happen that only a subset of measure zero of players have the same attribute. In this case, we obtain the following existence result as a consequence of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 Let G = ([0, 1], , α, Ω, U, A) be a dispersed induced game with a continuum of players such that U (Ω) is quasi-intermediate. Then, there exists a Nash
equilibrium of G displaying strong behavioral conformity.
and let h : Ω → A be a Nash equilibrium ofG = (λ, Ω, U, A)
. . , K and so f displays strong behavioral conformity.
Furthermore, f is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, let t ∈ [0, 1] and ω ∈ Ω be such that
for all a ∈ A, and so, f is a Nash equilibrium.
is not absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, there may fail to exist a Nash equilibrium of G displaying strong behavioral conformity. A simple example is obtained by letting Ω = [0, 2], α(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1],
Hence, it is impossible to partition Ω into two sets C 1 and C 2 in such a way that
Nevertheless, in this game there is a Nash equilibrium displaying behavioral conformity. In fact, letting C 1 = [0, 1] and C 2 = (1, 2], then 1 belongs to neither int(C 1 ) nor to int(C 2 ), implying that all strategies f satisfying • f −1
({b 1 }) = 1/2 are Nash equilibria displaying behavioral conformity.
The above conclusion can be extended beyond this example, as shown by the following result.
Theorem 3 Let G = ([0, 1], , α, Ω, U, A) be an induced game with a continuum of players such that U (Ω) is quasi-intermediate. Then, for every Nash equilibrium g of G, there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G that displays behavioral conformity and
. In particular, there exists a Nash equilibrium that displays behavioral conformity.
Theorem 3 shows that players' preferences being quasi-intermediate is a sufficient
condition for the existence of Nash equilibria displaying behavioral conformity in games with a continuum of players. In fact, every Nash equilibrium of such a game can be modified in order to produce another Nash equilibrium that displays behavioral conformity and induces the same distribution over actions. Hence, despite the fact that behavioral conformity is weaker here than in dispersed induced anonymous games with quasi-intermediate preferences, it is still the case that every distribution on A induced by a Nash equilibrium is consistent with behavioral conformity.
The idea of the proof is illustrated by the following examples. The first consists of the example given above. In this example,
Hence, one easily concludes that int(
)} for all i, j = 1, 2 and j = i. Hence, defining f (t) = a i if α(t) ∈ int(C i ), we only need to divide the remaining players (i.e., those
two actions in such a way that • f
)} for all i, j = 1, 2 and j = i can be established in general using Lemma 4 below. It states that for any pair of actions such that, for some attributes one action is preferred, while for others they are indifferent, we can easily determine whether a player with an attribute in the interior of Ω strictly prefers one of them or whether he is indifferent between them. In fact, we simply need to determine the position of his attribute relative to a hyperplane. Despite the fact that we assume that preferences are merely quasiintermediate and the attribute space is merely convex, this lemma can be proven using the same argument as in the proof of the Proposition in Grandmont (1978) .
However, since we do not assume that Ω is open, our conclusions apply only to points in the interior of Ω.
Lemma 4 Let a,ā ∈ A, µ ∈ M and suppose that Ω ⊆ R L is convex, U (Ω) is quasiintermediate and there existω,ω ∈ Ω such that Uω(a, µ) > Uω(ā, µ) and Uω(a, µ) =

Uω(ā, µ).
Then, there exist q ∈ R L , q = 0, and c ∈ R such that for all ω ∈ int(Ω), q · ω > c
, and q · ω < c when
The second example we consider is again of a trivial induced game in which all players are indifferent between all actions. As in Section 3, the pregame is defined by 
Then, there exists a convex partition
We can use Lemma 5 in the above example by considering C = Ω, L = 1, c 1 =
({a 2 }) = 1/3.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let g be a Nash equilibrium of G. We start by establishing a property of points in the interior of C a and D [a] , for a ∈ A(g) \ A i and a ∈ A i respectively.
In fact, suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that
In both cases, it follows from Lemma 4 that there exist q ∈ R L , q = 0 and c ∈ R such that for allω ∈ int(Ω),
In this case, define
We now turn to actions in A i . Letā ∈ A i . A similar argument to the one above
for all a ∈ [ā], it follows that
By Lemma 5, there exists a convex partition
To complete the proof, we need to specify
. This will follow from the Bollobás-Varopoulos Theorem (see Khan and Sun (1995, Theorem 4) ). Indeed, define 
Behavioral Conformity in Large Finite Games
In this section we consider the case of games with a large, but finite, number of players. Since we can understand games with a continuum of players as the limit of large finite games (see, for example, Green (1984) , Housman (1988) and Carmona (2004) ), one expects that properties that hold for Nash equilibria in games with a continuum of players will also hold in approximate equilibria for large finite games.
In fact, we use our previous results for dispersed induced anonymous games and for induced games to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium displaying (strong) behavioral conformity in all sufficiently large finite games.
Theorem 4 states that all sufficiently large finite games with a one-dimensional attribute space and an injective attribute function have an approximate equilibrium displaying strong behavioral conformity.
Theorem 4 Let G = (ϕ, Ω, U, A) be a pregame such that Ω ⊆ R and U (Ω) is equicontinuous and quasi-intermediate. Then, for all ε > 0 there is N ∈ N with the following property:
For all n ≥ N , every injective induced game G n = ((T n , ν n ), Ω, U, A, α) with n players has an ε -equilibrium that displays strong behavioral conformity.
The assumption that the attribute function is injective plays in Theorem 4 a role similar to the one that the dispersed assumption plays in Theorem 1. In fact, both guarantee that there is a small "number" of players with the same attribute.
The relationship between Theorems 1 and 4 is strengthened by noticing that the latter implies the former. This is illustrated by the following example. Let G n be such
that Ω, A and U are as defined in the first example of Section 5, and let α(t) = 2t/n for all t = 1, . . . , n. To this induced game with n players, we associate a dispersed anonymous game defined as follows: for all t ∈ T n , let Ω t be an interval containing we can easily check that the strategy f • α : T n → A is a Nash equilibrium of G n , and clearly displays strong behavioral conformity.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let ε > 0. Since U (Ω) is equicontinuous, let δ > 0 be such that
whenever ||τ − µ|| < δ, τ, µ ∈ M, a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω. Finally, let N ∈ N be such that |A|/n < δ whenever n ≥ N .
Let n ≥ N and G n = ((T n , ν n ), Ω, U, A, α) be an injective induced game with n players. Let α(T n ) = {ω 1 , . . . , ω n } and partition Ω into n intervals
if ω ∈ Ω i and a measure λ in Ω by
for all measurable subsets E of Ω. Then, λ(Ω i ) = 1/n and λ is non-atomic.
By Theorem 1, it follows that there exists a Nash equilibrium f of G = (Ω, λ, U, A)
in which all players best-reply and a partition
An important step in the argument is provided by the following lemma. Let
be a collection of pairwise disjoint convex subsets of
be a convex partition of X (i.e., C j is convex for all j = 1, . . . , K).
Lemma 6 For all convex subsets X of R and all N, K ∈ N, if |B| = N and |C| = K,
It follows by Lemma 6 that for at least n − K + 1 sets in
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}, let τ i,j = λ({ω ∈ Ω i : f (ω) = a j }) and
Define
Since f is a Nash equilibrium in which all players best-reply, it follows that
for all a ∈ A and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A, we obtain
where the first and third inequalities follow from (50), the second from (48) and the last from Lemma 11. Therefore, f • α is an ε -equilibrium of G n .
Similarly to the case of induced games with a continuum of players, if the attribute function is not injective, then there is no hope of guaranteing the existence of approximate equilibria displaying strong behavioral conformity in sufficiently large games. For instance, if we modify the example in this section so that α(t) = 1 for all t ∈ T n , then the resulting game has no approximate equilibrium displaying strong behavioral conformity.
Nevertheless, we can use Theorem 3 to establish the existence of approximate equilibria displaying behavioral conformity in all sufficiently large finite games.
Theorem 5 For all n ≥ N , every induced game G n = (T n , ν n , Ω, U, A, α) with n players has an ε -equilibrium that displays behavioral conformity.
Proof. Let ε > 0 and let η > 0 be such that 4η < ε. Since U (Ω) is equicontinuous, let δ > 0 be such that
whenever ||τ − µ|| < δ, τ, µ ∈ M, a ∈ A and ω ∈ Ω. Finally, let N ∈ N be such that 2|A| 2 /n < δ and |A|/n < η whenever n ≥ N .
Let n ≥ N and G n = ((T n , ν n ), Ω, α, U, A) be an induced game with n players.
. . , n and consider the induced
, and so on. Then,G has a Nash equilibrium f displaying behavioral conformity by Theorem
The equilibrium distribution can be represented in the following way:
for all a ∈ A.
Let E = {e 1 , . . . , e K } denote the standard basis of R K and define
nτ i,j ≥ 0 for all j and j:τ i,j >0 nτ i,j = 1. This implies that
and so by the Shapley-Folkman Theorem (see Rashid (1983) ), it follows that there
Let P = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : nα i ∈ E}. Define a pure strategy g as follows: if i ∈ P , let e j be such that nα i = e j and define g(i) = a j ; if i ∈ P , choose 1 ≤ j ≤ K such that τ i,j > 0 and define g(i) = a j . It then follows from inequality (51) that
) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A.
It follows by construction that g displays behavioral conformity. Indeed, if i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is such that α(i) ∈ int(C j ) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ K, then for all t ∈ I i ,
. Therefore, f (t) = a j for all t ∈ I i and so τ i,j = 1. Hence,
Then we can write
Hence,
and so
By Lemma 11, it follows that
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A.
Hence, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ A, we obtain
Therefore, g is a ε -equilibrium of G n .
Relation with Wooders et al.
Despite the fact that we have closely followed Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) for all a ∈ A, ∆ a = {x ∈ ∆ ∩ Q : x a > 0}. For all ω ∈ Ω and µ ∈ ∆ ∩ Q, define
Also, defineŨ
Lemma 7 For all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A, the function µ →Ũ ω (a, µ) is uniformly contin-
Proof. Let ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A and ε > 0. Let δ > 0 be as in the definition of the global interaction property and let µ, µ ∈ ∆ a be such that ||µ − µ || 1 = ā∈A |µā − µ ā | < δ.
If µ = (pā/q)ā ∈A and µ = (p ā /q )ā ∈A for some pā, p ā , q, q ∈ N for allā ∈ A, then µ = (q pā/qq )ā ∈A and µ = (qp ā /qq )ā ∈A .
Consider a game with n =players and α(t) = ω for all t ∈ T n . Let f and g be strategies such that
w ω,µ = w α,f and w ω,µ = w α,g . Hence, it follows by the global interaction property
and so µ →Ũ ω (a, µ) is uniformly continuous in ∆ a .
Since the set ∪ a∈A ({a} × ∆ a ) is dense in A × ∆, it follows thatŨ Let a ∈ A and µ ∈ ∆ a . Then, µ = (pā/n)ā ∈A for some n and pā ∈ N for allā ∈ A.
Consider two n-player games, one with α(t) = ω and the other with α (t) = ω for all t ∈ T n . Let f be a strategy such that ν n • f −1 = µ and f (1) = a. Then, by the continuity in attributes property, it follows that
Since ∪ a∈A {a} × ∆ a is dense in A × ∆ and both U ω and U ω are continuous, it follows
Hence, U is uniformly continuous.
It follows from Lemmas 7 and 8 that every WCS -pregame with a large game property induces a uniformly continuous pregame.
Theorem 6 in Ω × A induced by α and f , i.e.,
(ω, a) for all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A. Therefore, slightly abusing the notation, we can write h(ω, a,
) for all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A.
Furthermore, ifG satisfies within-type anonymity, then h depends only on the
) for all ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A. Lettingᾱ(t) = ω for all
, and so
). induce the same games and the same anonymous games.
Since Theorem 3 in Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) concerns only games induced by WCS -pregames satisfying both the within-type anonymity and the large game property, it follows from Theorem 7 that they can be obtained simply by using pregames. Therefore, their Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 5. In fact, if 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have approached the behavioral conformity problem of Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006) using the framework of games with a continuum of players. This has led to some improvements of their Theorem 3, not only in terms of weakening some of its assumptions, but also in terms of a simpler proof, able to accommodate easily the case of multi-dimensional attributes and arbitrary finite action spaces.
Although artificial, the case of a continuum of players is interesting even for someone who is only interested in games with a large but finite number of players. In fact,
as we have shown in Carmona (2004) , the limit points of the approximate equilibria of large finite games correspond to the Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players. In this paper, this correspondence between Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players and approximate equilibria of games with a large, finite number of players was precisely the tool we used to derive our generalization of Wooders et al.'s Theorem 3 from our Theorem 3 pertaining to games with a continuum of players.
Furthermore, it was also used to derive our strong behavioral conformity result for large, finite games (Theorem 4) from Theorem 1 pertaining to dispersed anonymous games.
We conclude with a remark on the definition of behavioral conformity: Theorems 1 and 2 (and their proofs) imply that if G is an induced anonymous game satisfying the assumptions of any of them, then G has a continuous λ -almost everywhere equilibrium. Such equilibrium also reflects the intuitive notion of behavioral conformity, since it implies that individuals that have similar attributes behave similarly, with possibly the exception of a small fraction of them. With this weaker notion of behavioral conformity one loses the notion of a society, but one may gain a more general behavioral conformity result. Also, it allows us to fit some interesting examples. One of those is the inner vs outer city behavior where cities are represented by circles: the inner city forms a society, but not the outer city. Let x ∈ C. By the supporting hyperplane theorem, let p ∈ R L be such that p = 0 8 I thank João Rosal for suggesting this example to me.
Consider the function m :
One easily sees that m is continuous, m(0) = 0 and lim η→∞ m(η) = λ(C). Since C is bounded, in fact, m(η) = λ(C) for someη > 0. Hence, there is η 1 > 0 such that m(η 1 ) = c 1 , and so define
which implies that λ(C 2 ) = c 2 .
Let i ≥ 3 and assume that we have found {η
Proof of Lemma 2. We may assume that B := {ω ∈ Ω :
is non-empty, since otherwise this result is trivial. For concreteness assume that
} is non-empty and let ω ∈ C By the separating hyperplane theorem, there exist q ∈ R L and c ∈ R such that q = 0 and q ·ω ≥ c ≥ q · ω for allω ∈ C and all ω ∈ B. 
(see Friedberg, Insel, and Spence (1997, Theorem 1.11, p. 49) ).
It then follows that 
. We start by establishing that {C η k } decreases: since η k η, it follows that
If z ∈ C η , and η > 0, then a similar argument to the one used to establish that Similarly, we can show that if
Note that it is enough to show that λ(
We have shown that both η k η and η k η imply that λ(C η k ) → λ(C η ). This shows that the function η → λ(C η ) is continuous. For all η ∈ R + , define
and define a function m : R + → R + by m(η) = λ(C η ). then C i = ∅ and so the conclusion follows. Therefore, we may assume that η i > η i−1 .
In this case, it follows that 
In conclusion, λ(int(C i )) ≤ c i for all i = 1, . . . , k.
As we have already pointed out, a measure with a finite support can be thought of as a vector in some Euclidean space. Roughly, Lemma 10 says that the Prohorov distance between two measures whose support is contained in some finite set is proportional to their Euclidean distance. Lemma 11 shows that in large games a player deviation has a small impact on the distribution of actions.
Lemma 11 Let G n = ((T, ν n ), U, A) be a game and let f be a strategy. Then,
for all ω ∈ T and a ∈ A.
Proof. Let ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A. Let τ = ν n • f Then, suppose that the conclusion holds for all K = 1, . . . , k, N ∈ N and all convex subsets X of R. Consider K = k + 1 and order the sets in B (resp. C) so that if x ∈ B i , y ∈ B j (resp. x ∈ C i , y ∈ C j ) and i < j, then x < y. Finally, if there is no i such that c ∈ B i , let i * = max{i : sup B i ≤ c} and the conclusion follows from the same argument used above.
